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Abstract
Causal reconstruction is the task of reading a written causal de-
scription of a physical behavior, forming an internal model of the de-
scribed activity, and demonstrating comprehension through question
answering. This task is dicult because written descriptions often
do not specify exactly how referenced events t together. This arti-
cle (1) characterizes the causal reconstruction problem, (2) presents a
representation called transition space, which portrays events in terms
of \transitions," or collections of changes expressible in everyday lan-
guage, and (3) describes a program called PATHFINDER, which uses
the transition space representation to perform causal reconstruction
on simplied English descriptions of physical activity. PATHFINDER
works by identifying partial matches between the representations of
events and using these matches to form causal chains, ll causal gaps,
and merge overlapping accounts of activity. By applying transforma-
tions to events prior to matching, PATHFINDER is also able to han-
dle a range of discontinuities arising from a writer's use of analogy or
abstraction.
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1 Introduction
Humans often learn about the causal workings of physical systems by reading writ-
ten descriptions of the sort appearing in encyclopedias, reports and user manuals.
This article presents research in getting programs to read and reason on the basis
of such descriptions [7, 8].
This task is both important and dicult. It is important because written
causal descriptions constitute not only an abundant resource for use in constructing
intelligent user manuals, design documentation systems and planning/diagnosis
systems, but also a convenient medium for interaction with these systems during
operation. Moreover, these descriptions cover a wide range of phenomena humans
nd dicult to describe by other means: complex interactions such as combustion
and phase changes, intuitive concepts such as sounds, paths and collections, and
metaphorically-modeled activities such as radio signals \spreading" in space.
The task is dicult because written causal descriptions rely heavily on the
reader's ability to supply missing objects and events, identify relations between
parts of the description, and perform inference from the information provided. One
especially dicult subtask is that of determining how the events in a description
t together into causal chains or overlapping accounts of activity, as often these
relationships are left implicit by the description.
As an example, consider the following excerpt taken from the opening para-
graph of the entry for \camera" in the Encyclopedia Americana [21]:
CAMERA. The basic function of a camera is to record a permanent
image on a piece of lm. When light enters a camera, it passes through
a lens and converges on the lm. It forms a latent image on the lm by
chemically altering the silver halides contained in the lm emulsion.
Given this description, a human previously unfamiliar with the operation of a
camera should be able to answer non-trivial questions such as the following:
\What happens to the distance between the light and the lm?" (: : :This distance
decreases, then disappears as the light converges on the lm.)
\How does the light `converging on the lm' relate to the light `forming the image
on the lm?' " (: : :The former causes the chemical alteration of the silver
halides, which change appearance, thus constituting the latter.)
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\How could a building reecting light into the camera cause the light to converge
on the lm?" (: : :This event ends with light entering the camera, from which
it passes through the lens and converges on the lm.)
\Does the light come into contact with the lm emulsion?" (: : :Yes. The light
contacts the silver halides while chemically altering them, and as these are a
part of the emulsion, the light must contact the emulsion.)
To answer these questions, the reader must identify unstated associations
among the referenced events and use these associations to assemble a unied
account of the activity. The rst question requires knowledge of the temporal
sequencing and overlapping of events, so that the progression of changes in a par-
ticular attribute can be recounted. The second question requires a summarization
of the indirect relationship between two events. The third and fourth questions
introduce new events to be associated causally with existing events or as a re-
description of part of the activity.
Loosely, we may dene the causal reconstruction problem as follows. As input,
we are given a written causal description, taken to be a body of text composed
by a human for the purpose of conveying knowledge of the causal workings of a
particular physical system to another human or computer program. Within the
causal description, several types of statements may appear. (The next section
presents a simplied account of causal descriptions as involving three types of
statements: references to the occurrence of particular events, static background
statements, and \connecting statements" describing general relationships between
referenced events.) Given this input, the task is to form an internal model of
the described activity|this model not directly accessible externally|and use the
model to demonstrate comprehension of the input description through question
answering.
What resources are available to the reader in completing this task? First, there
are several explicit features of causal descriptions that can provide assistance in
causal reconstruction. Considering only the event references, narrative ordering
can be taken as a clue to chronological or even causal ordering of events. In
the following simple description, narrative ordering correctly indicates a causal
relationship between the rst and second events.
The steam rises. The steam contacts the metal plate.
Similarly, roles played by the objects in the events provide clues to inter-event
relationships. In the example below, a causal chain from the rst event to the
second event is suggested by both narrative ordering and the fact that \the staple"
appears as the patient in the rst event and then as the agent in the second event.
The metal tab presses against the staple. The staple pierces the paper.
2
On the other hand, there are also many cases where these simple heuristics do
not work, as illustrated by the following two examples:
The hand holds the bolt. The bolt remains between the rst nger and the
second nger.
The metal table melts the ice cube. The ice cube lands on the metal table.
In the rst example, the events do not form a chain as suggested by both narrative
ordering and object role-playing; rather, the events are concurrent, with the second
merely restating part of the activity of the rst. In the second example, the
narrative ordering heuristic would suggest a causal chain from the rst event to
the second. In this case, however, the only plausible interpretation is that the
second event, landing on the metal table, has caused the rst event, melting of the
ice cube.
Another source of assistance to the reader are explicit declarations of inter-event
relationships appearing in a description (\connecting statements," as described in
the next section). These statements assert, for example, that one event causes
another, precedes another, or is a part of another.
While such declarations do provide assistance in causal reconstruction, they do
not provide so much help as to trivialize the task. First, these statements simply
do not appear with enough regularity in written descriptions to provide dependable
indications of inter-event relationships. Indeed, in some cases we could require on
the order of N
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such assertions for a set of N events, since by knowing that event
A is a part of event C and that event B is also a part of event C, we still do not
know how events A and B relate to one another.
There is a more fundamental shortcoming of explicit declarations of inter-event
associations, however, and this shortcoming applies also to the narrative ordering
and object role-playing heuristics in those cases where they provide useful clues.
The problem is that all of these devices provide only general indications of how
particular events are related to one another. In the above situation involving events
A, B and C, what we really need to know is which parts of event C correspond to
each of the events A and B. Similarly, if we are told that event I causes event J,
we still do not know what part of I leads to the initiation of J|is it the middle
of I? The end of I? We need to know this in order to answer questions about the
time sequence of changes for particular attributes, such as the rst question listed
above for the camera description. As a result, the reader must take recourse in
his or her knowledge of what happens during particular types of events in order to
work out specic inter-event relationships consistent with the general framework of
indications provided by devices such as connecting statements, narrative ordering
and object role-playing.
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The core of the approach advanced in this article is a representation called
transition space, capturing knowledge about what happens during physical events.
Two important insights are embodied in this approach. First, by representing
events primarily in terms of transitions|or sets of changes occurring during the
temporal unfolding of events|a wide range of associations between events may be
recognized by looking for partial matches, or overlaps, between the representations
of individual events. The use of changes as a basis for matching draws motivation
from two general sources:
 Research in psychology characterizes perceived causality as an association
between consecutive changes in a scene|as, for example, when a person
observes an ongoing sequence of physical activity [46, 47].
 When describing activity|especiallywhere qualitative changes are involved|
it is often necessary to refer explicitly to changes rather than their component
states as causal antecedents and consequences. For example, if two objects
come into contact and one breaks, it is not the state of being in contact that
causes the breakage, but rather a transition from non-contact to contact.
Similarly, the causal eect is not one of being broken, but becoming broken.
The second insight is that transition-based representations of events are easy
to generate from simple, stylized verbal accounts of what happens during these
events. This would seem to be because language inherently stresses information
about transitions when used to describe the temporal unfolding of physical activity.
Use of the transition space representation for performing causal reconstruc-
tion has been tested in PATHFINDER, a 20,000 line program coded in Common
Lisp and run on a Symbolics 3640 Lisp Machine. The primary component of
this program is a set of utilities for representing, matching and conducting infer-
ence and transformations on events in transition space. Additional components
include a parser operating on a simple context-free skeleton of English grammar,
a simple language generation capability, and a set of supervisory routines for con-
ducting causal reconstruction. PATHFINDER has been applied to over 60 causal
descriptions, including a simplied version of the camera description appearing
above. The remaining descriptions processed by PATHFINDER involve mostly
2{4 events each and span a wide range of physical domains including: interaction
between solid objects and liquids, condensation and melting, combustion, radio
signals, light, chemical reactions and electric currents.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 present the three principal components of this research:
the causal reconstruction problem, the transition space representation, and the
PATHFINDER program. Related literature is discussed in Section 5, and conclu-
sions of the research appear in Section 6.
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Figure 1: Causal modeling versus causal reconstruction.
2 Causal Reconstruction
The previous section dened causal reconstruction as the task of reading a written
causal description, forming an internal model of the described activity, and demon-
strating comprehension through question answering. This section characterizes the
task more precisely.
Causal reconstruction is related to causal modeling [17, 53] in that both tasks
involve acquisition of knowledge needed to perform causal reasoning. The tasks dif-
fer with respect to the source of this knowledge. Figure 1 illustrates the two tasks
schematically. In causal modeling, causal knowledge is obtained from direct obser-
vation of the environment. In particular, the input data has not been organized
or ltered by an intermediate agent prior to entry into the program. In contrast,
causal reconstruction involves input expressly supplied by an intermediate agent
already possessing causal knowledge of a situation. While the research presented
here concerns textual input only, in general, the input might vary between text,
diagrams, animations, numerical data, equations, and other types of information.
The intermediate agent present in the causal reconstruction task aects the
nature of this task profoundly in two ways. First, this agent is assumed to be
committed to the objective of eciently communicating the desired causal infor-
mation. Thus, we can characterize that agent as a \cooperative" participant in
the communication process and expect the agent to comply where possible with
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conversational maxims as outlined by Grice [27]:
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The maxim of quantity. Provide as much information as is required for the
current purposes of the exchange, but do not provide more information than
is required.
The maxim of quality. Try to make your contribution one that is true.
The maxim of relation. Be relevant.
The maxim of manner. Be perspicuous. (Avoid obscurity of expression, avoid
ambiguity, be brief and be orderly.)
From the comprehender's perspective, these constraints sanction inferences in
certain cases. For example, from the maxim of relation, the comprehender may
assume that since a piece of information has been included in the input text, it
is indeed relevant and must be related to some other piece of information in the
input text.
The second consequence of inserting an intermediate agent in the process is that
in eect, the objective for the comprehender is not one of modeling a causal system
in the world|for that matter, the input description could conceivably concern a
ctitious system|but rather to replicate a causal model known to the intermediate
agent (hence, the choice of the term \reconstruction"). This in turn aects what
may be taken as a successful completion of the task.
Assuming for the moment that we have at our disposal an eective means of
inspecting the comprehender's causal model, we might as a rst approximation
require that the comprehender's model match precisely the causal model held by
the agent composing the description. But we can easily see that this is too restric-
tive. For example, if the described system is a mechanical one, the comprehender's
model could certainly be at a dierent scale in terms of physical size, or oriented
dierently in space, or it could contain parts having dierent shapes or composi-
tion than the corresponding parts in the writer's model. A better criterion is to
insist that the new causal model be consistent with the writer's causal model to
the extent of the information appearing in the description. Another way of saying
this is that the comprehender's causal model must also be describable using the
input description. Viewed in this way, we may make a second appeal to Grice's
Maxims of Conversation, this time in the context of the input description taken
as an account of the comprehender's newly-constructed causal model. If, by these
maxims, we nd that the original description is unacceptable as an account of
this new model, we may then claim that the new model is faulty and that the
comprehender has failed at the task of causal reconstruction. Specically, Grice's
1
Although these constraints are advanced with respect to spoken interaction, we would expect
writers of causal descriptions to obey such constraints as well.
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Maxims motivate use of the following criteria when evaluating the comprehender's
understanding of the described activity.
From the maxim of quantity:
1.) Does the comprehender's model introduce new objects or events not motivated
in the causal description? (If so, the comprehender's model is unacceptable,
because the description is required to be adequately informative in motivat-
ing such objects or events.)
From the maxim of quality:
2.) Does the new model disagree in any way with the description? (If so, the new
model is unacceptable, because the description is required to be truthful.)
3.) Is the new model physically unrealizable? (If so, it is unacceptable, because we
take the description to provide an account of a physically realizable behavior.)
From the maxim of relation:
4.) Does the new model fail to incorporate any information supplied in the de-
scription? (If so, the new model is unacceptable, because the description is
required to contain only relevant information.)
5.) Does the new model fail to associate any pair of events? (If so, we may
disqualify the new model on the grounds that a causal description is expected
to relate|causally or otherwise|a set of events.)
From the maxim of manner:
6.) Does the new model make any component of the description redundant, such
that the description could be condensed without loss of informativeness?
(Suppose the new model interprets two referenced events as describing the
same identical activity. It may then be rejected on the grounds that the de-
scription is required to be brief and may not contain redundant statements.)
Human evaluation is inherent in assessing success at causal reconstruction,
since causal descriptions are at present only identiable and understandable to
humans. The criteria listed above help transform this overall assessment into a set
of specic judgments that are less open to dispute.
Returning to the issue of how the comprehender's model might be inspected,
we see a further opportunity for increasing the precision of the evaluation process.
By requiring a demonstration on the part of the comprehender, we can better
assess the actual value of the comprehender's newly gained knowledge, as it may
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be argued that new facts in a target representation have value only relative to
the agent's ability to put that knowledge to use. In this article, we consider such
demonstration through question answering; however, in a broader sense, we might
take the demonstration to include activities such as paraphrasing the input causal
description, acting out or constructing an animation of the described scenario.
A nal precaution relevant to the assessment process concerns the standard-
ization of conditions under which the entire causal reconstruction process takes
place. Motivating this standardization is the fact that Grice's Maxims depend on
the intended audience for an utterance; for example, in describing a situation to a
child, one must include more information. For automated comprehension of causal
descriptions, it is entirely unclear what supporting knowledge a program should
have available to it for use in comprehension. For simplicity, then, we assume an
absence of relevant background knowledge on the part of the program. As a result,
we require denitions for events, static properties of objects, rules of inference and
so forth to accompany an input description. This simplies the task, but by no
means trivializes it. Given the pieces of a puzzle, the program must still determine
how these pieces t together.
2.1 Task Restrictions for PATHFINDER
In constructing the PATHFINDER program, several simplications to the general
causal reconstruction task were required. This section outlines these simplica-
tions. First, PATHFINDER sidesteps a number of dicult issues in natural lan-
guage processing, accepting input descriptions consisting solely of three types of
statements:
event references, noting the occurrence of specic events (e.g., \The rocket
pushes away the jet of exhaust." or \The iron bar rusts."),
background statements, describing static properties and relationships that hold
for the duration of the described activity (e.g., \The liquid is combustible."
or \The hub is a part of the wheel."), and
connecting statements, specifying explicit relationships between events appear-
ing in the description (e.g., \The bar pushing on the beam causes the beam to
move." or \The component moving is a part of the structure expanding.").
2
In addition, Grice's maxims are raised to the level of requirements for the writer,
rather than admonitions open to compromise in delicate communication contexts,
as originally described by Grice.
2
In naturally-occurring causal descriptions, devices such as causal and temporal connectives
serve in this capacity.
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In compliance with the maxim of quantity relative to the program's assumed
blank knowledge base, the following components of supplementary information
are also accepted by PATHFINDER as part of an input specication. Examples
of these constructs appear in Section 4.1:
additional background statements, supplying object types and static rela-
tionships between objects,
event denitions, describing generic occurrences of events,
precedent events, possibly required for comprehension,
rules of inference, as relevant to the activity, and
rules of restatement, relating alternate descriptions of the same activity.
Regarding the product of causal reconstruction, PATHFINDER is targeted to
demonstrate comprehension by answering four types of questions. These questions
relate to two levels of comprehension applicable to causal descriptions:
the event level, concerning properties, relationships and other attributes of events
occurring in the described situation, and
the object level, concerning properties, relationships and other attributes of ob-
jects involved in those events, and how these change during the unfolding of
events.
The four types of questions elded by PATHFINDER are listed below. Ques-
tions of type 1 address comprehension at the object level, and the remaining types
address comprehension at the event level:
Type 1. Questions concerning the time-course of changes in particular attributes
of objects. For example:
What happens to the position of the jet of exhaust?
When is the light inside the camera?
Type 2. Questions concerning relationships between particular events referenced
in the input description. For example:
How does the light entering the camera relate to the light passing through
the lens?
How does the transmitting of the radio wave into space relate to the
strength of the radio wave decreasing?
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Type 3. Questions concerning possible causal relationships between events refer-
enced in the description and new events introduced at the time of questioning.
Such questions may be used to explore simple predictions or explanations be-
yond the immediate context of a causal description. For example:
How could the water boiling cause the steam to condense on the metal plate?
How could the trigger moving cause the hammer to hit the ring pin?
Type 4. Questions concerning the possible paraphrasing of a portion of the ac-
tivity in terms of a newly-supplied event. For example:
Does the steam convert to a liquid?
Is the wheel pushed?
3 Transition Space
Section 1 argued that in order to successfully perform causal reconstruction, a
program must have knowledge of what happens during particular types of physical
events. Since the program is replicating a human skill, a good source of constraint
for the representation of what happens during events is the psychological literature
regarding events. Several useful guidelines may be extracted from this literature,
as outlined below.
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Representation in terms of objects and attributes. \Objects" may be tak-
en to include any quantities whose properties, relationships or other at-
tributes may be described; e.g., physical objects, spaces, paths, events, sys-
tems, and so forth. Attributes may be physical (e.g., distance, size and
shape) or conceptual (e.g., being a member of a collection). In [47], Miller
and Johnson-Laird present a good summary of objects and attributes used
by humans in describing the world. These authors characterize attributes
as typically unary (e.g, size) or binary (e.g., distance), and also as either
qualitative (e.g., color or contact) or quantitative (e.g., length or pressure).
Time as a sequence of moments. Investigation by Newtson and his colleagues
[50, 51] indicates that time is perceived|at least at the level of conscious
awareness|as a sequence of discrete moments rather than a continuum of
activity. Further research by these investigators indicates that events are
delimited by specic \breakpoints"|time points at which signicant changes
are perceived by the observer.
Qualitative comparisons and changes. Following from the superiority of
humans at relative|as opposed to absolute|estimation of attribute values,
it is natural to represent both static comparisons and dynamic changes in a
qualitative manner [47].
3
Several of these guidelines also serve to motivate work in qualitative physics [15, 22, 37].
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Causation as an association between changes. Experimental evidence char-
acterizes perceived causality as an association between consecutive changes
in a scene [46]. Concurring accounts appear in the cognitive development
literature [43, 63] and elsewhere in psychology [47].
The nal point above is signicant. While a number of representations in-
clude states as possible antecedents or consequents of causality, it would seem that
changes are most suitable in the perceptually-oriented realm of physical activity.
Intuition would seem to concur with this characterization of causality. Regard-
ing causal antecedents, if states are to do the causing, then we might ask why a
causal eect occurs precisely when it does and not earlier; thus, we are led to sus-
pect that some additional ingredient has fallen into place just prior to the causal
eect. This nal change may then be ascribed as the antecedent of causality. Re-
garding causal eects, if there is no change in a scene, then causation contributes
nothing to the reasoning process; we can reason just as well with what we knew
to be true beforehand.
Certainly, representations permitting states as causal antecedents and conse-
quents have utility. For example, we may usefully speak of a \state" of low blood
sugar resulting in various eects if we choose a level of abstraction factoring out
ongoing circulatory and metabolic processes in the body. In other cases, we may
incorporate dynamic information into the specication of states, as when we refer
to \moving" objects or characterize instantaneous changes in quantities as \in-
creasing," \decreasing" or \steady," as in the qualitative physics literature.
However, such techniques are not always applicable. In particular, instanta-
neous directions of change can be specied only for quantitative attributes, like
\temperature" or \elevation," which can be dierentiated with respect to time,
but not for qualitative attributes, like \contact," \support," and \inside," as of-
ten appear in verbal accounts of activity. For example, if two objects come into
contact, with one object breaking as a result, there is no \state of coming into
contact" to serve as the causal antecedent. At one instant the objects are not in
contact, and this certainly does not cause the breakage, and at a subsequent in-
stant they are in contact|but this cannot be attributed as the antecedent either,
because they could have been simply resting, in contact, for a long time. A better
characterization identies the causal antecedent as the change from non-contact to
contact between the two objects.
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Likewise, the causal consequent in this example
is more suitably characterized as a change from unbroken to broken for the second
object, rather than simply a state of being broken.
Representing causality as an association between changes|where these changes
4
Additionally, of course, there are other less articulable factors contributing to the breakage:
sucient momentum on the part of the rst object, sucient brittleness for the second object,
sucient inelasticity of the collision, and so forth.
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may involve quantitative or qualitative attributes appearing in verbal accounts of
activity|we are led to the notion of transition space. In transition space, indi-
vidual points|or transitions|correspond to possible combinations of changes in
relevant attributes of objects participating in a described causal scenario. Events
may be thought of as short paths in this space, corresponding to sequences or sim-
ple directed, acyclic graphs of transitions. As such, events comprise simple causal
explanations which may be combined to produce larger causal explanations|larger
\paths" in transition space|that serve as models of described activities.
Important to the construction of this representation is its basis in verbal ac-
counts of activity. Attributes and their changes are taken directly from simple,
stylized English statements. Thus, the representation has not only an established
semantics (grounded in that of the English statements on which it is based), but
as well, individual assertions in the representation may be converted back into
their corresponding verbal form when necessary in order to discuss the suitability
of representing particular events in particular ways.
Equally important, it should be noted that in grounding the representation in
verbal accounts of activity, those aspects of human knowledge about events that
are less easily expressed verbally are omitted. For instance, the representation is
not intended to capture spatial knowledge of a non-propositional nature, as used
in estimating shapes, directions, textures and so forth. Also, it is not intended
to capture knowledge underlying human ability to classify objects and situations
from visual or other sensory perceptions, or knowledge underlying human ability
to estimate likelihood of various causal circumstances. These types of knowledge
are doubtlessly required for processing some descriptions; however, as illustrated
in this article, there is also a range of simple descriptions that can be processed
solely on the basis of articulable knowledge about what happens during events.
Listed below are several examples of the sorts of statements of change ground-
ing the transition space representation (attributes appear in boldface, characteri-
zations of change appear in italics).
The contact between the steam and the metal plate appears.
The concentration of the solution increases.
The appearance of the lm changes.
The pin becomes a part of the structure.
The water remains inside the tank.
The change characterizations in these expressions are limited in number. As-
suming the existence of a \false" or \absent" value in the range of each attribute,
then if a particular attribute of one or more objects is specied as either present or
absent at each of two time points, one of which follows the other, and we include
possible information concerning the qualitative relationship between the attribute
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values at the two time points, then the following set of ten change characterizations
covers the range of alternate circumstances based on this information:
The ten change characterizations are depicted as predicates taking four argu-
ments: an attribute of concern, an object or tuple specifying multiple objects, a
rst time point and a second time point. The assertions below correspond to each
of the English statements above.
APPEAR(contact, <the-steam, the-metal-plate>, t1, t2)
INCREASE(concentration, the-solution, t3, t4)
CHANGE(appearance, the-lm, t5, t6)
APPEAR(a-part-of, <the-pin, the-structure>, t7, t8)
NOT-DISAPPEAR(inside, <the-water, the-tank>, t9, t10)
Two grammatical forms are currently used in PATHFINDER for entering the
English statements grounding the transition space representation.
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The rst form
is as follows:
<attribute-expression> <verb-group>
where
<attribute-expression> ::=
the <attribute> <preposition> <noun-phrase>
f f <preposition> j and g <noun-phrase> g*
and the verb group indicates one of the ten change characterizations. The rst
three sentences above are of this form. The second form, illustrated in the last
5
The grammar used by PATHFINDER is a simple context-free semantic grammar [31]. Other
grammatical forms for specifying changes could be included in an extended grammar (e.g., spec-
ications such as \The water increases in temperature.").
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two sentences above, is applicable only to certain boolean attributes and involves
a single object followed by a restricted set of verbs (\becomes," \becomes not,"
\remains" and \remains not") and a predicate modier expression:
<object> <verb-group> <predicate-modier>
where
<predicate-modier> ::=
<attribute> [ [<preposition>] <noun-phrase>
f f <preposition> j and g <noun-phrase> g* ]
A variant of this second form covers the \is-a" attribute and includes statements
such as \The water becomes a vapor." and \The solution remains an acid.".
Together, the grammatical forms for entering statements regarding changes
cover a wide range of phenomena, as illustrated by the following examples:
The interaction between the wrench and the bolt disappears.
The frequency of the disturbance decreases.
The usefulness of the device for the task disappears.
The surface remains sticky.
The plate becomes fastened to the housing.
The structure becomes covered by the extinguishing foam.
The rod remains not bent.
The weather vane becomes directed from the west to the east.
The liquid remains frozen.
The sponge becomes dry.
While the ten change characterization predicates of the representation are at
an appropriate level of abstraction for association with simple English assertions of
change, a number of overlaps exist between these predicates and thus they are un-
suitable as primitives in the representation (six of the predicates are specializations
of \NOT-DISAPPEAR," and some pairs of these six are compatible while others
are not). By constructing denitions for these predicates in terms of two primi-
tive ve-place predicates \EQUAL" and \GREATER," plus their negations, the
processes of matching and inference on event representations are simplied consid-
erably. The following paragraphs develop the entire representation in a bottom-up
manner, from these primitives to the representation of events.
The following ve types of symbols appear in the representation:
Objects, both perceptual and conceptual. For example: solids; quantities of
liquid, gas, re, etc.; spaces, surfaces, paths and edges; events and sequences;
collections|ultimately, anything that may participate in an event.
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Attributes, both perceptual and conceptual. For example: length, width, depth,
size, weight and color; position, elevation, orientation, speed, heading, direc-
tion, distance; \insideness," pressure, contact, restraint; \is-a," \a-kind-of,"
\made-of," \part-of," \before" and \after." As in everyday language, a de-
gree of overlap appears in the set of attributes.
Time points, as needed to distinguish points of comparison within events.
Reference standards, used as xed points of reference for comparison. For ex-
ample: object types (\solid," \event," \collection," etc.), colors, substances,
numbers, qualitative directions such as \up" and \forward," a xed frame of
reference for motion (\the-background"), and a quantity \null" representing
the \false" or \absent" state for all attributes.
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Predicates, used in assertions comparing attribute values. For qualitative
attributes, \EQUAL" and \NOT-EQUAL" serve as primitive predicates.
For quantitative attributes, these plus \GREATER" and \NOT-GREATER"
serve as primitives.
Reference standards have two distinct functions: they serve as unchanging
points of reference for comparisons, and they span dierent description discourses.
As unchanging points of reference, reference standards support certain types of in-
ference. Suppose the color of an object is specied as matching the color \green"
at one time point, and is specied as not changing in color over an interval from
that time point to a later time point. We would like to conclude that the ob-
ject is still green; however, this requires an assumption that the color green has
not changed during the course of that same interval: this assumption is provided
by classifying \green" as a reference standard. The other aspect, spanning of de-
scription discourses, distinguishes reference standards from objects, which must be
individualized so that their mention in two dierent discourses serves to generate
two distinct symbols, not one (e.g., \the-pin-1" versus \the-pin-2").
The primitivepredicates \EQUAL," \NOT-EQUAL," \GREATER" and \NOT-
GREATER" take ve arguments: an attribute for comparison, a rst object and
associated time point, and a second object and associated time point. For binary
attributes, tuples of objects are used in the second and fourth positions. Addi-
tionally, for unusual attributes such as \between," a nesting of tuples is employed.
Three simple assertions involving these predicates are given below.
GREATER(length, object-1, t1, object-2, t1)
NOT-EQUAL(position, <object-1, the-background>, t1,
<object-1, the-background>, t2)
EQUAL(distance, <object-1, object-2>, t1, null, t1)
6
Reference standards are called \prototypes" in [6].
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The rst assertion states that \object-1" has greater length than \object-2" at
time \t1." The second, that the position of \object-1" relative to \the-background"
is dierent at time \t1" and time \t2" (i.e., \object-1" has moved). The third,
utilizing a comparison to the \null" reference standard, states that there is no
distance between \object-1" and \object-2" at time \t1."
From the primitives, we rst dene a set of six predicates for making assertions
at a single time point. In these denitions, variables are denoted by labels begin-
ning with \?". Also, note that several of the \NOT-" forms are not strict logical
negations: they assume some of the same information as the positive forms, in line
with common usage of these terms in language.
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t1) ()
NOT-EQUAL(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, null, ?t1)
NOT-PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t1) ()
EQUAL(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, null, ?t1)
MATCH(?attribute, ?object-1, ?object-2, ?t1) ()
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t1) AND
EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t1)
NOT-MATCH(?attribute, ?object-1, ?object-2, ?t1) ()
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t1) AND
NOT-EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t1)
EXCEED(?attribute, ?object-1, ?object-2, ?t1) ()
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t1) AND
GREATER(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t1)
NOT-EXCEED(?attribute, ?object-1, ?object-2, ?t1) ()
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t1) AND
NOT-GREATER(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t1)
For comparisons across time points, the following denitions specify the ten
change characterizations introduced above. (In these denitions, \null" is also
used to designate an irrelevant time point argument.)
APPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
PRESENT(after, <?t2, ?t1>, null) AND
NOT-PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t2)
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NOT-APPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
PRESENT(after, <?t2, ?t1>, null) AND
NOT-PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t1) AND
NOT-PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t2)
DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
PRESENT(after, <?t2, ?t1>, null) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t1) AND
NOT-PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t2)
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
PRESENT(after, <?t2, ?t1>, null) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(?attribute, ?object, ?t2)
CHANGE(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) AND
NOT-EQUAL(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?object, ?t2)
NOT-CHANGE(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) AND
EQUAL(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?object, ?t2)
INCREASE(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) AND
GREATER(?attribute, ?object, ?t2, ?object, ?t1)
NOT-INCREASE(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) AND
NOT-GREATER(?attribute, ?object, ?t2, ?object, ?t1)
DECREASE(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) AND
GREATER(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?object, ?t2)
NOT-DECREASE(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) ()
NOT-DISAPPEAR(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?t2) AND
NOT-GREATER(?attribute, ?object, ?t1, ?object, ?t2)
A transition is a set of assertions at and between two ordered time points.
Events are sequences, or more generally, directed acyclic graphs of transitions. The
representations for events are called event traces, highlighting their correspondence
to simple paths in transition space.
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Figure 2: Event trace depicting the event \push away."
Throughout this article, a special graphic format is employed for illustrating
transitions and event traces. This format highlights dynamic information, with
static information listed simply as assertions beneath the graphic representation if
necessary. In these diagrams, the ten change characterizations are coded as follows:
Figure 2 illustrates the graphic representation for an event trace depicting the
event \push away." This event has two transitions, each specied as a column of
coded assertions between vertical lines depicting time points. The time points are
labeled at the bottom, and arguments to each attribute are provided at the left.
Also, for expository purposes, a drawing is included above each transition: these
drawings are not part of the actual representation as used by PATHFINDER.
The rst transition of this event trace may be read as follows: the distance
between \object-11" and \object-12" does not appear, contact between the two
objects does not disappear, pressure between the objects appears, the position of
\object-12" does not change relative to \the background," and speed and heading
(direction of motion) of \object-12" with respect to the background do not ap-
pear. In the second transition, distance appears between the two objects, contact
18
Figure 3: Transmission of a radio wave into space.
and pressure disappear, the position of \object-12" changes with respect to \the
background," and speed and heading appear for \object-12."
Contrasting with the event trace in Figure 2 is the event trace illustrated
in Figure 3, representing the transmission of a radio wave into space. This trace
incorporates a conceptual object (the radio wave) and a metaphorically-applied
attribute (\inside"). \Space" is represented as a reference standard, as this is a
discourse-independent, relatively unchanging quantity.
In general, a particular event may be represented in a range of ways in tran-
sition space, depending on such choices as: (1) the selection and granularity of
participating objects for the event, (2) the selection and granularity of particular
attributes for describing those objects, and (3) the granularity of time points. The
transition space representation explicitly provides this latitude and furthermore
explicitly addresses the issue of how such alternate descriptions of events can be
matched with one another. This is an inherent part of the causal reconstruction
task, as the comprehension of causal descriptions inescapably involves a reconcilia-
tion of events often described at dierent levels of abstraction or possibly in terms
of dierent underlying metaphors.
In the other direction, several intuitive guidelines help constrain the use of
transition space in representing particular events expressible in language. The
following list summarizes these guidelines.
 The granularity of temporal intervals is generally not so ne as to produce
adjacent, identical transitions (e.g., each attribute specifying something like
an \INCREASE" followed by an \INCREASE").
 On the other hand, intervals are suciently subdivided so as to indicate sets
of changes that cause other sets of changes, and the temporal granularity may
vary within an event trace. Extremely ne temporal granularity may be used
19
to represent such situations as appearance of pressure from one object to a
second leading to return pressure from the second to the rst.
 In all cases, we should be able to say that there exists a causal relationship
between the set of changes in one transition and the set of changes in an
immediately following transition.
 Unless an event depicts non-activity (e.g., \not moving"), the representation
should always include at least one denite change (APPEAR, DISAPPEAR,
CHANGE, INCREASE or DECREASE) in its opening transition.
 All attributes and assertions needed to discriminate a typical instance of
an event from other types of events should be included. For example, the
representation for \enter" should include not only a rst object appearing
\inside" a second, but movement for the rst as well. Otherwise, the speci-
cation would also account for the event \move to surround."
7
 On the other hand, we may choose to omit particular attributes or change
characterizations where we wish to accommodate variations within the set
of typical occurrences for an event. For example, when one object hits a
second object, information on motion of the rst object following the instant
of contact may be excluded to allow for possible bouncing, stopping, etc. of
that object.
3.1 Matching Between Event Traces
Given a set of event traces for the events in a causal description, simple inter-event
associations may be detected by identifying partial matches between the traces.
As an example, consider the following simple description:
The board is dented. The wrench is dropped.
Note that while this description is certainly understandable|that is, we as
humans can determine how the two referenced events might t together|it is not
as directly stated as it could be. For example, the description could have been
presented as \The wrench is dropped. The wrench dents the board.". However,
supplied in the above-listed form, the description illustrates a simple situation
where neither temporal ordering of event references nor role-playing by objects
involved in the events can help in determining how the events t together. That
7
In the examples run on PATHFINDER, some liberty has been taken with respect to this
guideline; for example, object type information is often excluded where an event involves only
physical objects.
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is, we really need to know what happens during the stated events in order to
determine how these two events might be related to one another.
Figure 4 illustrates two event traces corresponding to the \denting" and
\dropping" events in the above description. These traces are derived from the
generic event denitions appearing below. The denitions are written in stylized
English as accepted by PATHFINDER and serve to generate an initial set of pat-
tern event traces which are then mapped to the particular circumstances of the
events referenced in the description.
8
Object 1 denting object 2 translates to the following event.
First, the position of object 1 changes, the speed of object 1
does not disappear, the heading of object 1 does not
disappear, the distance between object 1 and object 2
decreases, and the contact between object 1 and object 2 does
not appear. Next, the position of object 1 changes, the speed
of object 1 disappears, the heading of object 1 disappears,
the distance between object 1 and object 2 disappears, and the
contact between object 1 and object 2 appears. Next, space 3
becomes a dent, space 3 becomes a part of object 2, and object
1 becomes inside space 3.
Object 11 dropping object 12 translates to the following
event. First, the distance between object 11 and object 12
appears, the contact between object 11 and object 12
disappears, object 11 becomes not in control of object 12, the
support of object 12 by object 11 disappears, object 12
becomes not supported, the position of object 12 does not
change, the speed of object 12 does not appear, the heading of
object 12 does not appear, and the elevation of object 12 does
not change. Next, the distance between object 11 and object
12 does not disappear, the contact between object 11 and
object 12 does not appear, object 11 remains not in control of
object 12, the support of object 12 by object 11 does not
appear, object 12 remains not supported, the position of
object 12 changes, the speed of object 12 appears, the heading
of object 12 appears, and the elevation of object 12
decreases. Next, the distance between object 11 and object 12
does not disappear, the contact between object 11 and object
12 does not appear, object 11 remains not in control of object
12, the support of object 12 by object 11 does not appear,
8
For ease in specifying changes in \position," \speed," \heading," \orientation," \angular
speed" and \angular heading," PATHFINDER behaves as if the phrase \with respect to the
background" has been included where no second object has been specied as a frame of reference.
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Figure 4: Event traces for the description: \The board is dented. The wrench is
dropped." A partial match between the two traces is indicated.
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object 12 remains not supported, the position of object 12
changes, the speed of object 12 increases, the heading of
object 12 does not disappear, and the elevation of object 12
decreases.
In mapping the generic event denition traces to the description-specic ver-
sions appearing in Figure 4, several hypothesized objects must be introduced, as
both event references in the original description appear in passive voice with no
agent specied. (Also, the implicit dent appears as a hypothesized object \o2.")
For the \denting" event, a hypothesized object approaches and then contacts the
board, followed by the appearance of a dent in the board. For the \dropping"
event, a hypothesized object comes out of contact and relinquishes control of the
wrench, followed by the wrench starting and continuing to fall.
The supplied event denitions are intended to be generic in nature, not referring
to the specic circumstances of the described situation. In particular, the deni-
tion for denting|and thus PATHFINDER's depiction of the event \The board is
dented."|leaves open the issue of whether the object causing the denting comes
to rest at the completion of the denting or continues its motion, acquiring new
speed and heading in the interval from \t46" to \t12." Separately, because the
dent does not exist prior to \t46," no information is provided concerning it prior
to this point.
9
Given the event traces appearing in Figure 4, the next step is to enumerate
partial matches between these traces. Here, we distinguish between two classes of
partial matches. In the rst class, partial chaining matches, one event continues
the activity originating in another event. In the second class, partial restate-
ment matches, two events match in some other way. Partial chaining matches can
be taken as an indication of a plausible causal connection between two events;
partial restatement matches simply indicate an overlap in the activity described
by two events. More precisely, the following denition is used to distinguish partial
chaining from partial restatement matches:
A partial chaining match between two event traces is a single interval
match involving at least one denite change (APPEAR, DISAPPEAR,
CHANGE, INCREASE or DECREASE) and situated such that ex-
actly one of the traces is begun by the matching interval and continues
beyond the matching interval.
In this denition, two extra provisions have been added to the initial charac-
terization appearing in the above text. The rst is that the match consist of a
9
The numbering of time points in PATHFINDER does not always reect their temporal
sequencing. This is an artifact of the implementation.
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single interval. Intuitively, it would seem that events overlapping in more than one
successive complex of changes are more restatements of one another than causally
associated events; however, this rather subjective restriction could alternatively
be omitted. The second provision is that at least one denite change be involved
in the match. This restriction is included so that events involving no changes|
for example, continued support of a block by a table|may not be taken as causal
antecedents of other events|for example, the block sliding o the end of the table.
Given the event traces depicted in Figure 4, six partial matches may be identi-
ed. All but one of these matches are unacceptable, as they either result in incon-
sistencies if inference is conducted on the combined assertions of the two events
(e.g., one event may state that speed \appears" while the other that it \does not
disappear") or equate the distinct objects \the wrench" and \the board." Thus,
in this simple example, no comparative ranking of partial matches is required to
determine how the events might be related to one another. In the general case,
of course, many acceptable partial matches may exist between the various pairs
of events referenced in a description. Section 4 describes the heuristics used by
PATHFINDER in choosing among alternative partial matches.
The remaining acceptable partial match is illustrated in Figure 4. Note that
with regard the attribute \speed" in this match, an assertion involving the pred-
icate INCREASE in the \dropping" trace has been matched with an assertion
involving the predicate NOT-DISAPPEAR in the \denting" trace. This particu-
lar matching of assertions relies on the fact that the an INCREASE assertion covers
a NOT-DISAPPEAR assertion (i.e., its expansion at the level of (NOT-)EQUAL
and (NOT-)GREATER assertions is a superset of the corresponding expansion for
the NOT-DISAPPEAR assertion).
The match identied here is a partial association, as the transitions in question
do not match completely. The two transitions involved in the match are really dis-
tinct points in transition space: they involve distinct time points and objects, and
furthermore, each contains additional assertions not appearing in the other. In the
interest of performing subsequent question-answering, it is useful to work out in
greater detail exactly how the two events are associated with one another. This is
accomplished by a process of elaboration, involving the application of simple trans-
formations to the two event traces in order to bring the concerned transitions into
a complete match. Here, we distinguish between two classes of transformations:
information-preserving and non-information-preserving. Transformations of the
rst type belong to inverse pairs of transformations on event traces in transition
space; transformations of the second type do not.
The choice of transformations applied in the elaboration process is based on
information contained in the partial match. This information is presented below
for the partial match of concern between the denting and dropping events. The
three matching assertions are indicated as they appear in the \denting" activity,
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with the bindings providing a mapping to equivalent assertions in the context of
the \dropping" activity.
match type: partial chaining
rst trace: trace-48 (\The wrench is dropped.")
second trace: trace-17 (\The board is dented.")
matched assertions:
CHANGE(position, <o1, the-background>, t11, t45)
NOT-DISAPPEAR(speed, <o1, the-background>, t11, t45)
NOT-DISAPPEAR(heading, <o1, the-background>, t11, t45)
bindings: f [t66 / t11], [t22 / t45], [the-wrench-1 / o1] g
Figure 5 illustrates how the partial match between the original event traces
may be elaborated to produce a chain of three transformations and a complete
chaining match. Traces A and B are the original \denting" and \dropping" traces,
respectively. Trace B is transformed by a reduction operation (a non-information-
preserving transformation) which removes all assertions except those involved in
the partial match or tracking the same attribute-object combinations|\position,"
\speed," and \heading" of \o1" with respect to \the-background"|for other inter-
vals. This reduction transformation produces trace C. Trace A is rst transformed
by an equivalence operation (an information-preserving transformation), replacing
time points \t11" and \t45" with their matched equivalents \t66" and \t22" and
replacing the hypothesized object \o1" with its matched equivalent \the-wrench-
1." This transformation produces trace D. Trace E is then produced by a reduction
operation on trace D, removing all assertions except those concerning \position,"
\speed," and \heading" of \the-wrench-1" with respect to \the-background," as
involved in the partial match. Finally, traces C and E are associated by a complete
chaining match, as the third transition in trace C is identical to the rst transition
in trace E.
A set of event traces linked by complete associations|transformations and
complete chaining or restatement matches|is called an association structure. As-
sociation structures can be diagramed using a second, more abstract graphic
format corresponding to a stylized three-dimensional characterization of transition
space. Figure 6 illustrates this format for the sequence of associations indicated
in Figure 5. Here, transitions appear as points, with event traces depicted as
arrows, or more generally as directed acyclic graphs. Heavy arrows depict original
traces for events referenced in a description; lighter arrows depict intermediate
traces formed in elaboration of a partial match. Finally, associations are repre-
sented by alignment of the event traces in three dimensions: horizontal for com-
plete chaining matches, vertical for non-information-preserving transformations,
and depthwise for information-preserving transformations (including complete re-
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Figure 5: Transformations bringing the \denting" and \dropping" traces into a
complete chaining match.
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Figure 6: Association structure for the denting/dropping example.
statement matches, which involve a similar mapping of quantities from one trace
to the other).
Construction of an association structure by identifying and elaborating par-
tial matches between events constitutes most of the work done by PATHFINDER
in the course of performing causal reconstruction. The remaining subsections in
this section outline additional mechanisms enhancing this basic approach. Once
an association structure has been constructed, questions of the sort elded by
PATHFINDER can be answered. This part of the processing is illustrated in Sec-
tion 4.1, in the specic context of the camera example introduced at the beginning
of the article.
3.2 Inference and Background Statements
The rst extension has to do with the inclusion of deductive inference. While
partial matches serve as the basis for identifying associations between events, in-
ference can be used to augment event traces with relevant new assertions, this
providing a broader basis for detecting partial matches among the traces. Back-
ground statements supplied as part of a causal description (e.g., \The water is
inside the tank.") may be included in the inference process.
A second use of inference concerns the checking of partial matches for consis-
tency. Given time point and object equivalences generated by a partial match, it
may be the case that the combined set of assertions for the matched event traces is
logically inconsistent. When this happens, the partial match in question must be
discarded or expanded into a set of reduced partial matches, each of which omits
one of the indicated equivalences.
Orthogonal to the question of when inference is to be used, there is also a
question of what types of inference may be of use. Two types of inference present
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themselves: inference concerning predicates in the transition space representation,
and inference concerning attributes in the representation.
As dened above, each of the predicates used in our realization of transition
space decomposes into a set of assertions involving only the primitives EQUAL,
NOT-EQUAL, GREATER and NOT-GREATER. Taking advantage of this fact,
we may conduct inference over predicates by focusing entirely on relationships be-
tween these four primitive predicates. Higher-level predicates may be converted
into their corresponding EQUAL/GREATER-level expansions prior to inference,
and following inference, the resulting set of assertions may be condensed where
possible to redescribe the activity in terms of the higher-level dened predicates.
It is a rather simple matter to enumerate logical relationships between EQUAL,
NOT-EQUAL, GREATER and NOT-GREATER, and such rules are directly im-
plemented within the PATHFINDER program. Following are a few examples of
these rules:
EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t2)
=) EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t2, ?object-1, ?t1)
EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t2) AND
GREATER(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t2, ?object-3, ?t3)
=) GREATER(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-3, ?t3)
NOT-GREATER(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t2) AND
NOT-GREATER(?attribute, ?object-2, ?t2, ?object-1, ?t1)
=) EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t2)
In addition, PATHFINDER uses a similar set of rules to detect logical inconsis-
tencies. Two examples of these rules are as follows:
NOT-EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-1, ?t1)
=) : : : inconsistency
EQUAL(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t2) AND
GREATER(?attribute, ?object-1, ?t1, ?object-2, ?t2)
=) : : : inconsistency
In contrast to inference involving predicates, inference involving attributes re-
lies on a potentially limitless set of inference rules. These rules can express sym-
metric or transitive relationships for binary attributes:
PRESENT(contact, <?o1, ?o2>, ?t1)
=) PRESENT(contact, <?o2, ?o1>, ?t1)
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PRESENT(above, <?o1, ?o2>, ?t1)
=) NOT-PRESENT(above, <?o2, ?o1>, ?t1)
PRESENT(inside, <?o1, ?o2>, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(inside, <?o2, ?o3>, ?t1)
=) PRESENT(inside, <?o1, ?o3>, ?t1)
or they may express arbitrary relationships between dierent attributes:
PRESENT(contact, <?o1, ?o2>, ?t1)
=) NOT-PRESENT(distance, <?o1, ?o2>, ?t1)
PRESENT(inside, <?o1, ?o2>, ?t1) AND
PRESENT(above, <?o2, ?o3>, ?t1)
=) PRESENT(above, <?o1, ?o3>, ?t1)
A particular implementation strategy has been found to improve considerably
the time eciency of the inference process in PATHFINDER. By this strategy,
assertions involving the predicate \EQUAL" are used to construct equivalence
classes of attribute{object{time-point triples, as, for example:
f (speed, <object-1, the-background>, t11),
(speed, <object-1, the-background>, t12),
(speed, <object-1, the-background>, t13) g
Assertions involving \NOT-EQUAL," \GREATER" and \NOT-GREATER" are
then maintained with respect to these equivalence classes rather than with respect
to particular members of the classes, resulting in a corresponding reduction in size
for the base of assertions over which inference is conducted.
Background statements supplied in the input to a program can also contribute
to the inference process. The following are examples of simple background state-
ments expressible using the input grammar for PATHFINDER.
The block is a solid object.
The beam is not exible.
The support of object 1 by object 2 is present.
The elevation of the ceiling exceeds the elevation of the oor.
These statements are translated into simple assertions involving the predicates
PRESENT, NOT-PRESENT, MATCH, NOT-MATCH, EXCEED and NOT-EX-
CEED, as dened above. Due to the time-invariant nature of these assertions,
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the value \null" is again used as a time point argument. The following assertions
represent each of the background statements listed above.
PRESENT(is-a, <the-block, solid-object>, null)
NOT-PRESENT(exible, the-beam, null)
PRESENT(support, <object-1, object-2>, null)
EXCEEDS(elevation, <the-ceiling, the-oor>, null)
Once a base of background assertions has been set up, rules of inference can
be applied to extend the set of background assertions, producing new assertions
of the same time-independent nature. Later, whenever inference is to be applied
to a specic event trace or set of event traces, the background assertions can be
instantiated to each specic time point of the involved event traces, augmenting the
set of assertions from which inference can draw new consequences. In this manner,
background statements can contribute both to the extension of event traces in
preparation for matching and the checking of partial matches for consistency.
3.3 Exploratory Transformations
As a second important extension, transformations of both varieties may be ap-
plied in an exploratory manner to event traces, forming alternate characteriza-
tions of events at dierent levels of abstraction or in terms of dierent underlying
metaphors. An event trace together with its transformed images forms a small
\cluster" of traces, all of which participate in the matching process. In this man-
ner, a program may bridge discontinuities arising from the writer's use of analogy
or abstraction.
Figure 7 illustrates a simple exploratory information-preserving transformation
of type substitution. If we are told that an object \slides to a stop," it is natural
to represent this by the rst trace. For a rotating object like a wheel, however,
a substitution of attributes taking us into the domain of spinning objects may be
more appropriate. By including both traces in the association process, we can
determine by matching which interpretation is correct. Beneath the event traces,
the association structure fragment produced by the transformation is illustrated.
By convention, event traces produced by exploratory transformation are depicted
in outline.
A second example appears in Figure 8. This transformation is also of type
substitution, but it is used in a dierent way. Suppose a statement in an input
description asserts that a radio wave \spreads thin" over space. Using a literal
account of this event as involving a liquid spreading thin over a supporting surface,
an inconsistency arises from multiple, conicting type specications: the radio
wave is specied as a radio wave from background information and as a liquid
from the spreading event. In this case, a suitable transformation to the domain
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Figure 7: An exploratory information-preserving transformation of type substitu-
tion.
Figure 8: A second substitution transformation.
of radio waves removes the conict, providing an initial consistent account of the
event suitable for matching. As described in Section 4.1, similar transformations
are required to process events of the camera description characterizing \the light"
as if it were a physical object entering and passing through other objects.
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Figure 9: An exploratory non-information-preserving transformation of type object
composition.
Figure 9 illustrates an exploratory non-information-preserving transformation
of type object composition. Suppose one object is specied as coming into contact
with a second object, and the second object is a part of a third object. An alternate,
more abstract specication of the event portrays the rst object as simply coming
into contact with the third object. Such a situation arises in processing the camera
description: light comes into contact with the silver halides as part of chemically
altering them, yet this must be matched with light \converging on the lm" which
contains the silver halides.
As a second example, a non-information-preserving transformation of type
attribute-object reication is illustrated in Figure 10. This transformation restates
a decrease in \speed" for \object-81" as a decrease in \size" for a new object,
\the-speed-of-object-81." In doing so, the initial application of a specic attribute
to a specic object has been reied as a new object in the representation (see,
for example, [23]). This particular transformation serves to bridge discontinuities
arising from the initial, literal interpretation of events specifying, for example, a
\reducing" or \trimming" of the speed of an object. Taken literally, such events
specify a decrease in size for an aected quantity.
10
10
As a means of anchoring the otherwise arbitrary symbol \the-speed-of-object-81," the left
side of the transformation includes a specication of this object as a measurement of \speed" for
\object-81."
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Figure 10: An attribute-object reication transformation.
The following list summarizes the range of exploratory transformations inves-
tigated in the course of the examples run on PATHFINDER. Details of these
transformations appear in [7].
11
Information-Preserving Exploratory Transformations:
Equivalence. Replacement of a time point, object, reference standard or
attribute with a synonym quantity, producing an alternate description of
the same event (e.g., replacing the attribute \support" with \supported-
by," in keeping with the equivalence of statements like \The support of
the book by the table does not disappear." and \The book remains
supported by the table.").
Substitution. Replacement of time points, objects, reference standards or
attributes with dierent, but parallel quantities in a new context, pro-
ducing a description of an event distinct from the original event, yet
parallel in the types of changes involved.
Non-information-Preserving Exploratory Transformations:
Generalization. Replacement of a reference standard (e.g., an object type
such as \container") with a new, more general reference standard (e.g.,
\physical object").
11
The complete set of association types explored in PATHFINDER includes these plus three
additional varieties: complete chaining associations and reduction transformations|these used
only in the elaboration of partial matches|and inference transformations|these considered sep-
arately from the exploratory transformations.
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Interval Composition. Merging of two adjacent time intervals into a single
composite interval, with changes specied according to the composition
of the changes in the original two intervals.
Attribute Composition. Reexpression of activity originally involving a
set of related attributes (e.g., \height," \width" and \depth") as ac-
tivity involving a single, encompassing attribute (e.g., \size").
Object Composition. Reexpression of activity originally involving the parts
of an object as activity involving the whole object.
Attribute-Object Reication. As illustrated above|replacement of ac-
tivity involving a particular attribute applied to a particular object with
assertions involving a newly-created object representing the attribute
applied to its argument.
Event-Attribute Reication. A transformation replacing part of an event
trace (e.g., changes involved in light striking a surface) with assertions
involving a newly-introduced attribute applied to one of the participat-
ing objects (e.g., \illuminated" applied to the surface).
Event-Object Reication. A transformation replacing part of an event
trace (e.g., changes involved in a collision) with assertions involving
a newly-created object representing the replaced activity (e.g., a new
object representing the collision, with other objects \engaged-in" the
collision object).
In all cases, exploratory transformations produce plausible redescriptions of
events|redescriptions that leave room for error. For example, the above object
composition transformation only speculates that coming into contact with a part
of an object might be redescribed as coming into contact with the whole, since
it is conceivable that \object-71" might already be in contact with some other
part of \object-73" before coming into contact with \object-72." For this reason,
transformed images of events are granted a probationary status, to be accepted only
when elaborated partial matches link these images to other known occurrences.
Implementationally, exploratory transformations take the form of bidirectional
rules acting to replace sets of assertions appearing in event traces with other sets
of assertions. These rules may be combined to form rule clusters corresponding to
more comprehensive transformations. Each rule in such a cluster describes an op-
eration to take in a particular circumstance (presence of a phenomenon, absence,
appearance, change, etc.). As a simplication, rules involving a complete match
between the two sides of the rule (e.g., the substitution transformations illustrated
above) are augmented by a binding list mapping time points, objects, reference
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standards and attributes between the two sides of the rule. Whenever such a rule is
found to be applicable to an event trace, the event trace is additionally transformed
by a substitution of terms according to this binding list. In many cases, this sim-
plication permits a single rule covering, say, presence of a concerned phenomenon,
to take the place of a large cluster of rules detailing alternate circumstances.
3.4 Connecting Statements
The third extension has to do with compliance with \connecting statements,"
as described in Section 2.1. Connecting statements abstract such devices as caus-
al/temporal connectives and adverbial phrases when used to indicate explicit inter-
event relationships. A good enumeration of such devices appears in [39]. As input
to PATHFINDER, connecting statements involve two nominalized event references
connected by a verb construction indicating a temporal relationship (e.g., \occurs
after"), causal relationship (\causes"), analogical relationship (\is equivalent to,"
\parallels"), or abstraction relationship (e.g., \summarizes"). The following are
examples of connecting statements accepted by PATHFINDER:
The ball moving occurs after the hitting of the block.
The structure expanding causes the component to move.
The pile growing summarizes the pile increasing in height.
The electric current traveling from the rst junction to the second junction
is equivalent to the electric current passing through the lament.
In many cases, it is possible to tell before elaboration of a partial match that
it will either: (1) guarantee compliance with a particular connecting statement,
or (2) guarantee a failure of compliance with a particular connecting statement.
In the heuristics for choosing among competing partial matches, PATHFINDER
rewards partial matches in the rst case and abandons them in the second case.
After a partial match has been elaborated, a more stringent test for compliance
with connecting statements is possible and may result in removal of the chain of
full associations generated from the partial match.
4 PATHFINDER
As stated in Section 1, PATHFINDER is a 20,000 line program coded in Common
Lisp and run on a Symbolics 3640 Lisp Machine. It contains a set of utilities for
representing, matching and conducting inference and transformations on events in
transition space, a parser operating on a simple context-free skeleton of English
grammar, a simple language generation capability, and a set of supervisory routines
for conducting causal reconstruction. PATHFINDER has been applied to over 60
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causal descriptions, most involving 2{4 events, in a wide range of physical domains
including: interaction between solid objects and liquids, condensation and melting,
combustion, radio signals, light, chemical reactions and electric currents.
All input to PATHFINDER consists of statements in simplied English. The
input grammar for PATHFINDER is a semantic grammar in that it includes
meaning-based categories such as \attribute," \object," \relative time expres-
sion" and so forth (see, for example, [31]). This grammar grounds out in a set
of ve non-terminal categories: object, reference-standard, attribute, verb-group
and preposition. The lexicon for PATHFINDER is initialized with a large set of
prepositions and attributes related to physical events, plus a range of verb groups
providing a foundation for the representation (e.g., \changes," \does not disap-
pear," and so forth). New members of all ve categories are inserted into the
lexicon following queries to a human operator during the parsing process.
Input quantities supplied to PATHFINDER were described in Section 2.1, and
examples of many of these quantities appear in Section 4.1. First, PATHFINDER
is given a causal description, consisting of (1) event references (\The light enters
the camera."), (2) background statements (\The head is a part of the nail.") and,
in some cases, (3) connecting statements (\The device starting to move causes the
lever to start to move."). Next, a set of supplementary information is provided,
possibly including (1) additional background statements, (2) event denitions, (3)
precedent events, which may be of use in reconstructing the activity, (4) rules
of inference, and (5) rules of restatement, including specications of analogical
mappings and rules of abstraction.
Given input in this form, PATHFINDER performs causal reconstruction in four
phases, as outlined in Figure 11 (a). In the rst phase, it parses the input text and
uses the supplied event denitions to form event traces for all events referenced
in the description, as illustrated in the context of the denting/dropping example
presented in Section 3.1. Background statements, rules of inference and rules of
restatement are also translated to transition space representations during this step.
In the second phase, PATHFINDER extends the event traces through inference
and applies exploratory transformations|these motivated by rules of inference and
rules of restatement in the input|producing for each event a cluster of traces de-
scribing that activity in dierent ways. The process begins with inference carried
out on each of the original event traces depicting referenced events and prece-
dents. The images of these traces under inference are next transformed where
possible via exploratory transformations, with the resulting images of transforma-
tion again extended through inference. This process continues recursively with
newly-generated image traces subjected to further transformation and inference
where possible. The process is bounded in a simple way by permitting only one
application of any particular transformation|applied in either the forward or re-
verse direction|to appear along any path of successively-applied transformations
36
Figure 11: (a) Four phases of execution for PATHFINDERwhen performing causal
reconstruction, (b) the association cycle.
emanating from one of the original event traces.
12
In the third phase of operation, PATHFINDER constructs an agenda of partial
12
Two alternate methods of bounding the transformation process are: (1) placing a depth
limit on the number of transformations performed on each initial event trace, and (2) abandon-
ing paths of successive transformation that yield duplicates or reductions of other event traces
produced thus far. The rst approach suers from arbitrariness, while the second does not bound
sequences of transformation that introduce new objects (e.g., a sequence of object composition
transformations postulating new subparts of parts of an object).
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matches between event traces in dierent clusters. By iteratively choosing the
top-ranked partial match and elaborating it in the manner outlined in Section 3.1,
PATHFINDER associates the clusters together.
Figure 11 (b) details the iterative cycle of the third phase. This process is seeded
with the set of event traces produced in phase two of PATHFINDER's operation;
on subsequent iterations, event traces formed during the previous elaboration of a
partial match are also included. At each iteration, event traces newly added to the
process are subjected to inference if this has not already been done, and partial
matches are enumerated between these new event traces and all traces involved
in the association process.
13
The generated partial matches are then inserted as
new entries in the agenda, and heuristics are used to score all agenda entries,
leading to the selection of a new partial match for consideration. This match
is then elaborated into a sequence of full associations, possibly generating new
intermediate event traces in the process. Also during elaboration, several checks
are conducted (as outlined below) to ensure that the chosen partial match is not
defective in some way. The entire cycle repeats until a single tree of associations
is produced, connecting all events referenced in the input description.
Several heuristics are used to rank the partial matches contained in PATH-
FINDER's agenda. A detailed account of the heuristic function used by PATH-
FINDER appears in Appendix A. The rst heuristic listed below is given strongest
inuence over the selection process.
Matching between transitions. Denite changes (APPEAR, DISAPPEAR,
CHANGE, INCREASE, DECREASE) are weighted most, other dynamic
assertions next and static assertions least.
Proximity to description events. Penalties are introduced for matches involv-
ing precedent events or exploratory transformations of events.
Narrative ordering. Preference is given to chaining matches between events ref-
erenced consecutively in the description.
Current status of the association structure. Penalties are introduced for
matches providing a second antecedent or consequent for an event, matches
between events already connected via associations, and matches involving
hypothesized objects (e.g., a conjectured part of a physical object).
Types of associations. Partial restatement matches are penalized slightly rela-
tive to partial chaining matches. Also, matches not fullling any connecting
statements are penalized slightly, and matches violating a connecting state-
ment are penalized heavily.
13
Actually, only traces marked \active" are used for matching. This set excludes traces that
have been extended via inference, traces that are reductions of other traces, and one of a pair of
traces linked by an equivalence association|these traces yielding only redundant or degenerate
partial matches relative to the matches for other traces not excluded from the active set.
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Following the selection of a partial match for elaboration, several additional
tests are conducted, as outlined below. Failure to pass one of these tests forces the
selected partial match to be discarded, possibly to be replaced in the agenda by
a set of reduced matches, each excluding one of the symbol pairs in the binding
list of the original match (e.g., \[t11 / t23]"), along with all matched assertions
requiring that particular symbol binding.
Equivalences between description objects. Partial matches must not equate
dierent objects named in the input description (e.g., \the hammer" and \the
nail"). However, such objects may be equated with hypothesized objects,
such as an unnamed actor of an event.
Logical inconsistency. The combined assertions of two matched traces must not
be logically inconsistent, given the object and time point equivalences gen-
erated by the matcher.
Violated connecting statements. A partial match must not violate an inter-
event relationship specied by a connecting statement in the description or
supplementary information.
In its fourth phase of operation, PATHFINDER elds questions of the four
varieties listed in Section 2.1. These questions are answered either by inspecting the
association structure completed in the third phase, or by performing one or more
additional cycles of association followed by inspection of the resulting association
structure. Specic procedures used in question answering are illustrated in the
context of the example presented in the following section.
4.1 Processing the Camera Description
This section describes PATHFINDER's processing of the camera description
introduced in Section 1. An abbreviated session transcript for the example appears
in Figures 12 and 13; excerpts from the input le appear in Figure 12 and
question answering excerpts appear in Figure 13. The complete input le for this
example plus additional samples of question answering appear in [7].
The causal description, shown in Figure 12 (a), contains six event references,
as follows:
The camera records the image on the film.
The light enters the camera.
The light passes through the lens.
The light converges on the film.
The light forms the image on the film.
The light chemically alters the silver halides.
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(a) (the causal description in simplied English)
The camera records the image on the film. The recording of the image
is a function of the camera. The light enters the camera. The light
passes through the lens. The light converges on the film. The light
forms the image on the film. The light chemically alters the silver
halides. The silver halides are contained in the emulsion. The
emulsion is a part of the film.
(b) (an event denition for \entering," involving physical objects)
Object 11 entering object 12 translates to the following event.
Concurrently, object 11 remains a physical object, object 12 remains a
physical object, object 12 remains hollow, the position of object 11
changes, the speed of object 11 does not disappear, the heading of
object 11 does not change, and object 11 becomes inside object 12.
(c) (a precedent event: change of appearance during chemical transformation)
Object 61 changes appearance from chemical transformation.
Object 61 changing appearance from chemical transformation translates
to the following event. Concurrently, object 61 remains a physical
object, object 61 becomes not made of substance 62, object 61 becomes
made of substance 63, and the appearance of object 61 changes.
(d) (a restatement rule: light viewed as a physical object w.r.t. \contact")
Concurrently, quantity 141 is a beam of light, object 142 is a
physical object, and the contact between quantity 141 and object 142
is present. The following statement parallels the preceding
statement. Concurrently, object 151 is a physical object, object 152
is a physical object, and the contact between object 151 and object
152 is present.
(e) (a restatement rule: contact with a part summarized as contact with the whole)
Concurrently, object 201 remains a part of object 202, the distance
between object 203 and object 201 disappears, and the contact between
object 203 and object 201 appears. The preceding statement is
summarized by the following statement. Concurrently, the distance
between object 203 and object 202 disappears, and the contact between
object 203 and object 202 appears.
Figure 12: Input text for the camera description (partial).
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(a) (a question of type 1: describing the time-varying status of a selected attribute)
What happens to the distance between the light and the film?
First, as the light passes through the lens, the distance between
the light and the film decreases. Next, as the light converges on
the film, the distance between the light and the film disappears.
Next, as the camera records the image on the film, the distance
between the light and the film does not appear.
(b) (a question of type 2: describing the interrelationship between two events)
How does the light converging on the film relate to the light forming
the image on the film?
The light converging on the film causes the light to chemically
alter the silver halides, which ends with the silver halides
changing appearance from chemical transformation, which occurs at
the end of the light forming the image on the film.
(c) (a question of type 3: identifying a plausible causal connection)
How could the building reflecting the light into the camera cause the
light to converge on the film?
The building reflecting the light into the camera could end with
the light entering the camera, which could cause the light to pass
through the lens, which could cause the light to converge on the
film.
(d) (a question of type 4: restating a portion of the activity)
Does the light come into contact with the emulsion?
Yes. The light coming into contact with the emulsion is a part of
the light converging on the film.
Figure 13: Question answering for the camera description.
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Also appearing in the causal description are three background statements:
The recording of the image is a function of the camera.
The silver halides are contained in the emulsion.
The emulsion is a part of the film.
Each statement in the input description to PATHFINDER nds motivation in
the original description extracted from the Encyclopedia Americana and listed in
Section 1, as a comparison with that description will conrm.
14
Following the causal description, the input le contains several segments of sup-
plementary information, including additional background information concerning
the types of each object (e.g., \The light is a beam of light."), generic deni-
tions for each of the six referenced events (e.g., Figure 12 (b)), one precedent
event|\Object 61 changes appearance from chemical transformation."|(Figure
12 (c)), ve rules of inference, three rules of restatement concerning light viewed
metaphorically as a physical object (e.g., Figure 12 (d)), and ve rules restatement
concerning abstraction relationships (e.g., Figure 12 (e)).
The presentation here chronicles PATHFINDER's processing of the example
rst in overview, followed by a more detailed consideration of a particular portion
of the generated association structure. Further discussion of PATHFINDER's
processing for this example may be found in [7].
During the rst phase PATHFINDER parses the input text and uses the sup-
plied event denitions to construct event traces for the six referenced events plus
the one precedent event. Rules of inference and restatement in the input text
are used to form inference and exploratory transformations, and these are used to
form alternate characterizations of the events in phase two. Figure 14 illustrates
the generated clusters of event traces at the end of phase two, using the graphical
format for association structures. As before, initial representations of events are
depicted using heavy arrows/dots, and transformed images are depicted in outline.
Traces A through F in Figure 14 depict the six events referenced in the description,
while trace G depicts the precedent event.
In the third phase, PATHFINDER executes six iterations of its association
cycle, working out associations between traces in dierent clusters of the partially
completed association structure. On the rst iteration of the association cycle,
PATHFINDER chooses among 120 candidate partial matches; on the remaining
iterations, similar numbers of partial matches are considered. At the end of the
association process, the seven clusters of traces have been associated together,
resulting in the completed association structure shown in Figure 15. (Unused
transformed images of traces are not shown in this gure.)
14
Also, the use of \by" in the original description could be taken as motivation for a connecting
statement \The light forming the image on the lm summarizes the light chemically altering the
silver halides.". PATHFINDER can process the description with or without this statement, and
since the latter situation is more dicult, it is this situation that is presented here.
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Figure 14: Partial association structure at the end of phase two of PATHFINDER's
operation.
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Figure 15: Status of the association structure at the end of the association phase
for the camera description.
The following discussion focuses on a portion of the association structure bridg-
ing two accounts at dierent levels of abstraction|namely, the portion relating the
two events \The light converges on the lm." (trace D) and \The light chemically
alters the silver halides." (trace F). Figure 16 illustrates the contents of the traces
marked D, M, F, W and Z in Figure 15. As noted above, traces M, W and Z have
been formed by exploratory transformations of the original two traces, D and F.
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Figure 16: Original traces and transformed images for a portion of the camera
description. A partial match is identied between traces M and Z.
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Figure 17: Part of the composite trace for the camera description. The indicated
row is used in answering the submitted question.
For M and W, a substitution transformation derived from the rule of restatement
shown in Figure 12 (d) has recast activity involving a physical object with activity
involving a beam of light.
15
For Z, an object composition transformation derived
from the rule of restatement shown in Figure 12 (e) has recast light contacting
the silver halides as light contacting the lm. A partial chaining match has been
identied between traces M and Z, both of which specify the light contacting the
lm. Finally, traces A1, B1 and C1 of Figure 15 have been produced by elabora-
tion of this partial match (involving an equivalence mapping from Z to B1, removal
of assertions from M to A1 and from B1 to C1, and chaining from A1 to C1).
After the events have been associated, PATHFINDER proceeds to its fourth
phase, question-answering. As described in Section 2.1, the rst type of ques-
tion answered by PATHFINDER concerns the time-varying status of particular
attributes of objects; e.g., \What happens to the distance between the light and
the lm?" To answer this, PATHFINDER forms a composite trace of the activity
by rst mapping traces in the association structure through indicated equivalence
associations so that they involve a consistent set of objects and time points, then
merging the sets of assertions in these traces in order to produce a composite ac-
count. Figure 17 illustrates part of the composite trace formed for the camera
description. Given this trace, PATHFINDER extracts the row relevant to the
submitted question and expresses this fragment in simple English, also inserting
phrases to situate the changes within the context of particular events within which
15
PATHFINDER routinely removes from event traces all assertions matched by background
assertions. Thus, following the substitution operations creating traces M and W from D and F,
all assertions concerning \the light" remaining a \beam of light" are removed from M and W.
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Priority Association type As expressed in English
1. SUBSTITUTION \...parallels..."
2. CHAINING \...causes..." / \...is caused by..."
3. REDUCTION \...is a part of..." / \...involves..."
4. GENERALIZATION,
COMPOSITION, and
REIFICATION \...summarizes..." / \...is summarized by..."
5. INFERENCE \...implies..." / \...is implied by..."
6. EQUIVALENCE \...is equivalent to..."
Table 1: Prioritization and English translations for association types, as used to
describe sequences of associations in PATHFINDER.
they occur. PATHFINDER's response for this question is listed in Figure 13 (a).
The second type of question concerns inter-event relationships; e.g., \How does
the light converging on the lm relate to the light forming the image on the lm?"
To answer this type of question, PATHFINDER extracts the sequence of associ-
ations connecting the specied events in the association structure and describes
this sequence in simple English, highlighting important associations as it goes. For
the above question, the relevant sequence is a chain of 14 associations involving
the description events \The light converges on the lm." and \The light forms
the image on the lm.", plus a transformed image of the description event \The
light chemically alters the silver halides." and a transformed image of the prece-
dent event \Object 61 changes appearance from chemical transformation.". This
sequence of associations is summarized below.
The light converges on the lm.
 ! SUBSTITUTION  ! REDUCTION
 ! CHAINING  ! REDUCTION (inverse)
(The light chemically alters the silver halides.)
 ! REDUCTION  ! REDUCTION (inverse)
(The silver halides change appearance from chemical transformation.)
 ! REDUCTION  ! REDUCTION (inverse)
 ! EQUIVALENCE  ! GENERALIZATION (inverse)
 ! INFERENCE (inverse)  ! COMPOSITION
 ! INFERENCE (inverse)  ! SUBSTITUTION
The light forms the image on the lm.
To summarize sequences of associations, PATHFINDER uses a prioritization of
association types. Between each pair of description/precedent events represented
along the sequence, the single association of highest priority is used to describe the
relationship between those events. Table 1 depicts the prioritization scheme found
to be most eective over the set of descriptions processed by PATHFINDER.
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If two associations of equal priority and opposite in orientation appear along
such a path segment, PATHFINDER defaults to a temporal characterization of
the inter-event relationship:
\: : :occurs at the beginning of : : :" / \: : :begins with : : :"
\: : :occurs at the end of : : :" / \: : :ends with : : :"
or, if these temporal characterizations do not t, a catch-all characterization:
\: : :coincides with : : :"
For the above question \How does the light converging on the lm relate to the
light forming the image on the lm?", the answer produced by PATHFINDER is
listed in Figure 13 (b).
16
The third and fourth types of questions also ask about inter-event associa-
tions, but require PATHFINDER to do further association rst. Otherwise, these
questions are handled in the same manner as questions of the second type. If
necessary, supplementary information such as event denitions may be provided
with these questions. The third type of question involves plausible causal associ-
ations, as might be used in making simple predictions or explanations; e.g., \How
could the building reecting the light into the camera cause the light to converge
on the lm?". For this particular question, PATHFINDER identies a partial re-
statement match between the building reecting the light into the camera and the
previously-specied event of the light entering the camera. After elaborating this
partial match, PATHFINDER traces the sequence of associations between the two
indicated events and answers as listed in Figure 13 (c).
The fourth type of question asks if a new event may be used to paraphrase a
part of the activity; e.g., \Does the light come into contact with the emulsion?".
For this particular question, PATHFINDER identies a partial restatement match
between the new event, the light coming into contact with the emulsion, and a
transformed version of the light converging on the lm. PATHFINDER's response
is listed in Figure 13 (d).
5 Related Literature
The work presented in this article relates to a rather diverse set of research eorts in
articial intelligence, psychology, linguistics and philosophy. This section outlines
some of these relationships.
16
The original representations for both of the concerned events are inconsistent, specifying
\the light" as a physical object. In answering questions, PATHFINDER ignores associations
that transform inconsistent accounts into consistent ones, and thus the substitution associations
in the extracted sequence are ignored.
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Perhaps the most closely allied research to that described here is the work in
reasoning about physical systems, and in particular, work in qualitative reason-
ing [15, 22, 37] and model-based reasoning [13, 14]. The approach described here
draws important motivation from these eorts and shares with them an emphasis
on representing physical activity in terms of time-varying parameters of participat-
ing objects, plus, in the case of qualitative reasoning, an emphasis on qualitative
characterization of changes in these parameters.
Due to the particular nature of the causal reconstruction task, there are also
some dierences between the approach described here and a signicant fraction
of the work in qualitative reasoning and model-based reasoning. The most cen-
tral dierence is a grounding of the representation in language, rather than in
a scientic model of a target physical behavior. This has an eect of bringing
into the representation a range of phenomena recognized and articulated by hu-
mans, yet normally not included in scientic accounts of activity: objects such as
beams of light, radio signals, sounds, dents, paths and so forth, and attributes like
\support," \inside," \appearance," and \shape," which are often fundamentally
qualitative in nature and rougher in granularity than the quantitative phenomena
supporting many scientic models of behavior. One result of this is that the tran-
sition space representation tends to be somewhat more macroscopic, with events
often spanning several qualitative states or operating regions of a device. Other
dierences with some the work in qualitative reasoning and model-based reason-
ing include a greater emphasis on representation at dierent levels of abstraction
and in terms of dierent underlying analogies, and the use of heuristically-guided
matching rather than constraint propagation as a mechanism for reasoning.
A number of other research eorts concerned with reasoning about physical sys-
tems have drawn wholly or in part on cognitive motivation [9, 29, 30, 41, 49, 57].
One example is the work in naive physics [29, 30]. Transition space shares with
this approach an ontological viewpoint that includes in the description of phys-
ical behavior many quantities appearing in everyday language|edges, surfaces,
quantities of liquid, spaces and so forth. Contrasting with this approach, however,
are the extended modes of reasoning employed in transition space, from heuristic
matching to the incorporation of analogy and abstraction. Separately, the research
described here also shares a basic orientation towards representation found in the
work on CYC [41], including a grounding out in language and a reliance on anal-
ogy and abstraction to ll in missing information (also articulated as the Breadth
Hypothesis in [42]). However, the tasks being addressed are somewhat dierent:
acquiring causal knowledge solely through language versus acquiring and organiz-
ing knowledge of all variety of things via language and/or direct entry of symbolic
information.
Also very relevant to the work described here is the literature on reasoning
about time, including research in reasoning about temporal ordering information
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[1, 60, 61] and reasoning about events and causality (e.g., [2, 45]). Following
the observation by Hanks and McDermott [28] that several non-monotonic logic
formalisms are insuciently constraining for the formation of simple predictions
about the future, several preference mechanisms have been oered for ordering the
set of extensions to a logical theory as required to make such predictions (e.g.,
[48, 58]). However, there remains a concern that no general preference criteria
may exist for this task [19]. An alternative, of course, is to employ heuristics in
selecting among candidate sequences of events. In particular, the work presented
here would suggest that in the specic context of postulating causal sequences
connecting events referenced in a written description, the heuristic of combining
events based on partial matches between their implied changes would appear to
be extremely useful.
Two research eorts in the area of causal modeling are those of Doyle [17, 18]
and Pearl and Verma [53]. While both t the characterization of causal model-
ing outlined in Section 2, there are some dierences between the two approaches.
Doyle's approach is largely symbolic, consisting of a set of device models for in-
dividual physical mechanisms, plus a set of heuristics for assembling the devices
into candidate models of a system, to be checked against input/output data using
constraint propagation. Pearl and Verma's approach is grounded in probability
calculations, and in this case, the causal modeling program is allowed to inter-
act with the system being modeled. Both approaches lend themselves to possible
interaction with the approach described here in targeting the combined causal
reconstruction/causal modeling problem occurring when a program is simultane-
ously presented with a causal description and a demonstration of a target physical
behavior.
The work described here is also related to research in analogy (e.g., [10, 24, 64]),
and possible interactions arise in this context as well. As many analogical reasoning
programs represent individual events by the equivalent of atomic formulae (e.g.,
\COLLIDE(o1, o2)"), these tting into larger systems of events to be associated
analogically, a promising approach would involve the use of transition space repre-
sentations to add further discriminatory power to such programs in deciding which
particular pairs of events ought to be matched in the course of associating larger
systems of events.
The work of Rieger [55] constitutes an important precedent for the work de-
scribed here. While this approach was never fully implemented and tested, it
carried a signicant intuitive appeal in modeling language comprehension of the
sort involved in causal reconstruction as involving search through a discrimina-
tion network for candidate device models, each supporting simple reasoning about
physical behavior. Some possible drawbacks of Rieger's approach include the pres-
ence of several overlapping varieties of causality, this making it dicult to establish
canonical representations for devices, the absence of an explicit notion of time, and,
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perhaps most signicantly, the absence of a mechanism for combining previously
unassociated physical mechanisms|that is, pairs of device models for which no
explicit relationship has been inserted into the knowledge base.
Providing an original motivation for the research described in this article is the
Event Shape Diagram representation of Waltz [62]. This representation describes
events in terms of various functions and assertions plotted against time (these
roughly equivalent to individual rows in the diagrams for event traces), with ad-
ditional assertions added to specify relationships between plottings. Event Shape
Diagrams can be used to draw distinctions between closely related events (e.g.,
\eat," \swallow," \nibble" and \gulp"), or to process metaphorical references to
events (e.g., a person \eating up" compliments). The work described here takes
this idea one step further in additionally using detailed knowledge of the temporal
unfolding of events to distinguish descriptions at dierent levels of abstraction and
to detect plausible causal associations between events. Also in this regard, the work
described here serves to extend another representation inspired by Event Shape
Diagrams: the Event Calculus representation [4, 5] used to summarize events oc-
curring in an observed scene given a time-log of object positions, orientations and
other simple properties as might be output from a computer vision system.
In the area of natural language understanding, the transition space approach
exhibits some similarity to the Conceptual Dependency representation and other
work in knowledge-based language comprehension [20, 36, 40, 56]. In common
between these approaches and the transition space representation is the notion
of representing events/actions as stereotypical instances to be matched with one
another. The transition space approach may be thought of as augmenting this
process to include matching of ne-grain information concerning the sequencing
and simultaneity of individual changes expressible in language.
Also relevant in the area of natural language understanding is the body of
work in spreading activation (e.g., [3, 12, 52, 54]. Much of the work in spreading
activation has dealt with narrative understanding|that is, stories about human
actions and their consequences. A possible diculty for this approach concerning
physical causality is that physical events are very context-dependent. For example,
if a hand lets go of an object, the object will fall only if it is not otherwise supported.
To represent this context in a semantic network, event nodes must be split into
subnodes depicting special cases, and this subdivision becomes rather unwieldy
if we consider the variety of possible contextual variations of each event and the
fact that only some of variants of one event may be linked to variants of another
event. Transition space captures this context directly as added assertions in an
event trace. These added assertions are then incorporated into the matching and
inference processes used to determine if two events may be related in a particular
way. A separate possible diculty concerning the use of spreading activation is
that this approach places a heavy burden on the knowledge engineer in charge of
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the network to explicitly enter all possible inter-event relationships|a task which
becomes progressively more dicult as the size of the network increases. For the
transition space representation, the inter-event associations are implicit. To enter
a new event, we need only specify what happens during the event, resulting in an
automatic association of that event with other events known to the system.
Section 3 listed several results/analyses from psychology relevant to the repre-
sentation of events and causality. Also relevant to the work described here is the
research in mental models [26, 34]. Of interest regarding the causal reconstruction
task are two types of results from this research: (1) documentation of cases where
humans successfully employ analogy to reason about abstract domains in terms
of simpler or more accessible domains (e.g., reasoning about electricity as if it
were owing water or a moving crowd [25], and (2) documentation of cases where
human reasoning fails due to a reliance on faulty models (e.g., taking force as re-
sponsible for motion rather than acceleration [11, 16, 44]). Both types of results
suggest components of supplementary knowledge useful for the comprehension of
causal descriptions|the latter being useful if we wish to compensate for faulty
explanations oered by the writers of particular causal descriptions.
Separately, research by Kahneman et al. [35] appeals to many of the same
concerns as mental models research. This work outlines several heuristics employed
by humans in simple reasoning tasks. Of these, the AvailabilityHeuristic is perhaps
most relevant to the task of causal reconstruction, as by this heuristic, a program
with a limited knowledge base of events, rules of inference and rules of restatement
may draw conclusions by generalizing over the possible reconstructions given its
limited repertoire of knowledge.
Concerning research in linguistics, Grice's Maxims of Conversation were men-
tioned in Section 2. Also relevant is the work in natural language semantics, as, for
instance, the work Jackendo [32] and Talmy [59]. Jackendo proposes a semantic
representation consisting of a few major ontological categories (e.g., thing, place,
direction, action, event, manner and amount) and a few major types of events (e.g.,
go, be and stay), these specialized as necessary to accommodate the circumstances
of particular semantic elds (e.g., spatial, temporal, possessive, identicational,
circumstantial and existential). Talmy proposes a \cognitive semantics," includ-
ing a central semantic category of \force dynamics" concerning the interaction
of quantities with respect to force. By analogy, a range of phenomena may be
viewed in terms of such interactions: mechanical activities, enabling and preven-
tion, social inuence, wanting and refraining, modal operators such as \can" and
\must," and so forth. Both Jackendo and Talmy thus oer a degree of encom-
passing organizational structure for the construction of a broad knowledge base of
events supporting causal reconstruction. In particular, these theories suggest the
possibility of performing causal reconstruction in a range of domains using only a
limited set of core events.
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The philosophical position advanced by Lako and Johnson [33, 38] also sup-
ports the idea of performing causal reconstruction in a range of domains using
a limited, core set of events. This work advances the view that metaphorical
language appears not only for stylistic reasons, but for reasons of underlying com-
prehension of particular domains in terms of other domains. As illustrations, the
authors present a number of extended analogies permitting not only redescription
of one activity in terms of another, but as well, reasoning about one activity in
terms of another. Examples of these analogies are: an-argument-is-war, time-is-a-
limited-resource, the-mind-is-a-container, ideas-are-objects, love-is-a-journey and
theories-are-buildings. In [33], an extended examination is given to such analogies
arising from basic functions and experiences of the human body. In combina-
tion with the work of Jackendo and Talmy, this theory would seem to suggest
that a suitable source of core events supporting causal reconstruction in a range
of domains might be a combination of bodily-kinesthetic and simple mechanical
interactions.
6 Conclusions
There are three main contributions of this work. The rst is a characterization
of the causal reconstruction problem, including a set of criteria for evaluating
performance of a program at the task and a sample program interface for testing
out particular approaches. Second is the transition space representation and its
accompanying machinery for associating events and answering questions about
causal descriptions. As highlighted in previous parts of this article, key aspects of
the transition space representation are its focus on information about changes as
a basis for determining how the events in a causal description might t together,
and its grounding in simple statements articulated in everyday language. The third
component is the PATHFINDER program, including a specic set of association
heuristics for use in causal reconstruction, and a range of simple examples processed
by the program.
Several immediate extensions of the current approach are possible, as well as
some broader extensions. One immediate extension involves expanding the asso-
ciation mechanism of PATHFINDER to produce a graph of associations between
the referenced events in a description, rather than simply a tree of associations.
This would be useful for processing descriptions in which one event summarizes a
chain of two or more events, and descriptions involving a fork in the activity which
later rejoins (e.g., a nail pushes back each of two bundles of wood bers, which
then spring back to grip the nail). To implement this extension, new heuristics
would be required to evaluate the usefulness of adding further associations to an
already-connected association structure in order to provide matches for particular
assertions not yet matched via inter-event associations. Other immediate exten-
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sions involve the addition of a backtracking mechanism or interactivity during the
association process in order to counteract or avoid initially-desirable associations
which become untenable in light of further association, and an extension of the
inference component to generate new assertions and detect conicts on the basis
of all event traces involved in the processing, rather than just individual traces or
pairs of traces as in the current version of PATHFINDER.
A related immediate extension concerns the informed application of exploratory
transformations. This would involve either the development of suitable heuristics
for deciding when and in which manner to transform event traces in order to
increase the likelihood of generating partial matches with other traces, or, perhaps
more suitably, the use of metric information to gauge the degree of granularity
for particular event descriptions with respect to temporal durations, physical size
of participating objects, specicity of attributes and so forth. Given this metric
information, it should then be possible to determine a suitable level of abstraction
and metaphorical specication for all events, then apply only those transformations
that take events closer to this common \arena" in transition space.
Moving to broader extensions, the following areas of exploration merit further
investigation:
Natural language input. PATHFINDER currently nesses a number of issues
in generalized natural language processing and could benet from the incor-
poration of additional techniques for handling such things as lexical ambigu-
ity, syntactic and semantic ambiguity, reference, tense and aspect, metonymy,
ellipsis, and focus. It is possible, however, that the transition space represen-
tation may be able to provide assistance in addressing some of these issues.
Concerning reference resolution, for example, it is conceivable that one im-
portant constraint governing the association of antecedents with pronouns
might be whether or not the particular event occurrences implied by such
associations t together with other events in the sense explored here.
Other types of input. The previous section mentioned the possibility of com-
bined causal reconstruction/causal modeling carried out by a program ac-
cepting a written description of an activity while exposed to a demonstra-
tion of the same activity. A related extension concerns the processing of
written descriptions coupled with diagrams. For both tasks, it may be the
case that a more elaborate treatment of spatial aspects of physical behavior
is required|that is, beyond the propositional treatment currently employed
in PATHFINDER. Separately, it may also be useful to explore causal recon-
struction involving a combination of text and equations as input, as when
a written description is used to supply intuitive background knowledge sur-
rounding the use of a highly-technical model of a physical process.
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Incremental causal reconstruction. It may be worthwhile to explore incre-
mental reconstruction of causal scenarios, such that an initial attempt is
made to associate the rst two events referenced in a description, then incor-
porate the next referenced event, and so forth. This would appear to be more
in line with human comprehension of causal descriptions. This approach was
not taken in the construction of PATHFINDER because it requires the de-
velopment of yet another set of heuristics, these regarding decisions of when
to proceed with the best current match for the sentences read so far, ver-
sus when to forgo a match in hopes of obtaining a better match once more
sentences are read.
Disjunctions of behaviors. Many descriptions of the sort appearing in encyclo-
pedias simultaneously specify several variants of a target behavior through
the use of conditional statements, hypothetical situations, or enumeration
of alternate behaviors. To handle such descriptions, a mechanism for repre-
senting and reasoning about disjunctions of behaviors is required. As part of
this, a facility for reasoning about relative likelihoods of alternatives would
presumably be required. Also related to disjunctive behaviors are repetitive
events and feedback cycles. While transformations of the event-object rei-
cation variety can be constructed to abstract sequences of repeated activities
into simple declarations of repetition of particular events, the ability to han-
dle disjunctions of behaviors could support reasoning about specic numbers
of iterations (if small) for these types of events.
Accumulated supporting knowledge. Also mentioned in the previous section
was the possible incorporation of a preset knowledge base of core events,
rules of inference, rules of restatement and so forth, supporting causal re-
construction in a range of domains. One way to construct such a knowledge
base is to perform causal reconstruction in a cumulative manner, maintaining
supplementary knowledge between processing sessions and perhaps weeding
out knowledge used only sparingly in the future. As suggested in the previ-
ous section, a good place to start might be with causal situations involving
bodily-kinesthetic events or simple mechanical events, then progress to other,
less perceptually vivid domains (e.g., radio signals, electricity, biological pro-
cesses) by relying heavily on analogies to these events. Some of the examples
explored on PATHFINDER provide initial support for this hypothesis.
Appendix A. PATHFINDER Heuristics
New event traces are added to the association structure when: (1) the initial
set of referenced events and precedents is added, (2) inference and exploratory
transformations generate images of these traces, and (3) elaboration of partial
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matches generates intermediate traces. As characterized in Section 4, inference,
reduction and equivalence associations in the association structure determine which
traces are considered \active" for matching. New active traces are then matched
with all existing active traces not belonging to the same cluster of traces in the
association structure.
Partial matches enumerated by the program are labeled as either partial chain-
ing matches or partial restatement matches, using the rule specied in Section
3.1. Partial restatement matches may involve more than a single matching in-
terval. For partial chaining matches, a record is made of assertions appearing in
the consequent trace that are covered by assertions in the antecedent trace. For
partial restatement matches, a record is made of assertions appearing in the trace
previously existing in the association structure that are covered by assertions in
the trace newly added to the association structure.
Given a partial match determined in this manner, PATHFINDER rst forms
a raw score for the partial match, as follows:
((10  [the number of denite changes|APPEAR, DISAPPEAR, CHANGE,
INCREASE and DECREASE|covered in the match]) +
(3  [the number of other dynamic assertions (NOT-APPEAR, etc.)
covered in the match]) +
(1  [the number of static assertions (PRESENT, etc.) covered in the
match]))

[the number of temporal intervals involved in the match]
This raw score is then reduced in response to applicable penalties from the
following list (e.g., for two 10% penalties and one 30% penalty, the raw score is
multiplied by (0:9)  (0:9) (0:7)).
Regarding proximity to description events:
10% penalty [if the rst trace has been formed by exploratory
transformation and does not lie along a path of
association between two description or precedent events]
10% penalty [if the second trace has been formed by exploratory
transformation and does not lie along a path of
association between two description or precedent events]
30% penalty [if the rst trace depicts a precedent event]
30% penalty [if the second trace depicts a precedent event]
Regarding narrative ordering of event references:
10% penalty [if the match is not a partial chaining match between
successively-referenced events in the description]
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10% penalty [if the match is a partial chaining match from one
referenced event to the immediately preceding event]
Regarding the current status of the association structure:
10% penalty [if the match involves a hypothesized object]
30% penalty [if the match equates two hypothesized objects]
30% penalty [if the match provides a redundant antecedent for an event]
30% penalty [if the match provides a redundant consequent for an event]
100% penalty [if the match involves two events already connected by a
path of associations]
Regarding types of associations:
10% penalty [if the match is a partial restatement match rather than
a partial chaining match]
30% penalty [if the match does not complete a path of association
fullling an explicitly-entered connecting statement]
100% penalty [if the match completes a path of association that
conicts with an explicitly-entered connecting
statement]
Once a partial match has been selected for elaboration (and removed from
the agenda, three additional tests are made, possibly resulting in a cessation of
processing for the partial match and insertion of new, reduced partial matches
in the agenda. As described in Section 4, these tests concern (1) equivalences
between description objects, (2) logical inconsistency, and (3) violated connecting
statements.
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